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Shenzhen Olax Technology CO.,Ltd
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Shenzhen OLAX Technology Co.,Ltd , which Located in Shenzhen, China. OLAX Technology established in 2010, It is a leading domestic supplier of wireless communication terminal technology solutions and equipment.Our main products are 4g C P E WIFI routers, USB WIFI dongles, modems. Pocket WIFI hotspot.G S M and C D M A fixed wireless telephones, terminals, Moreover, we support card lock, network lockand SIM card security.We have a core team with more than ten years of experience in R & D, sales ...
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USIM in 5G (NR) system (1)
1.UE and UICC In the mobile communication system defined by 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), the user's terminal (UE) device is composed of: ME (mobile equipment) + UICC (Universal Integrated Circuit Card); where UICC is a Physical cards that are tamper-proof and resistant to software and hardware attacks. 2. UICC and USIM UICC can contain multiple applications, one of which is USIM; USIM securely stores and processes all sensitive data related to the user and home network. USIM is under the control of the home network operator; the operator selects the data to be configured in the USIM before issuance and remotely manages the USIM in the user's device through the OTA (over-the-air) mechanism. 3.USIM in 5G 3GPP defines USIM for the 5G system in Rel-15 for access and use in 3GPP and non-3GPP networks, allowing UE (user equipment) external data networks. USIM is defined in Rel-16 as network slice specific authentication. 4.First-time authentication is a mandatory procedure to allow UE (user equipment) to access 3GPP or non-3GPP networks. EAP-AKA' or 5G-AKA are the only authentication methods that allow primary authentication and the subscription credentials are always stored in the USIM when the terminal supports 3GPP access functionality. For primary authentication based on AKA, the mutual authentication performed in the USIM and the generation of the key material (integrity key IK and confidentiality key CK) sent by the USIM to the ME remain unchanged compared to 3G, 4G and Meets 3GPP TS 33.102 specification [3]. Changes in 5G Primary Authentication USIM include storing new security context and additional keying material in USIM (depending on the USIM's configuration). 4.1 5G support If the USIM supports storing 5G parameters, the ME will store the new 5G security context and the new keys defined for the 5G key hierarchy (i.e. KAUSF, KSEAF and KAMF) in the USIM. USIM can store a 5G security context for 3GPP access networks and a 5G security context for non-3GPP access networks. Storing the security context and key material in the USIM ensures faster reconnection when roaming (UICC moves from one ME to another). 4.2 NPN support Authentication in private networks (called independent non-public networks) can rely on the EAP framework supported by the 5G system; user equipment and service networks can support 5G AKA, EAP-AKA' or any other key generation EAP authentication method, where: ·When using AKA-based authentication methods, clause 6.1 of 3PPTS 33501[1] applies. ·When selecting an EAP authentication method other than EAP-AKA', the selected method determines the credentials required in the UE and network. How these credentials for EAP methods other than EAPAKA' are stored and processed within the UE is beyond the scope. But to ensure a high level of security for access to private networks, private network operators may decide to require the presence and use of a UICC containing USIM applications in order to securely store and process subscription credentials for EAP methods such as EAP-AKA' or EAP-TLS . 5. Secondary authentication This is an optional authentication based on EAP, conducted between UE (user equipment) and DN (external data network). Although the choice of EAP authentication method and credentials is beyond the scope of 3GPP, external data networks may decide to protect access to their DN by performing strong authentication thanks to the EAP-AKA' or EAP-TLS authentication method, UICC in the user device The presence of USIM on the DN securely stores and processes the credentials used to access the DN. Network Slice Specific Authentication Using network slice specific authentication between the user device and the AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) server to access the network slice is optional. Network slice specific authentication is based on the EAP framework and its user ID and credentials are different from the 3GPP subscription credentials. It follows the mandatory primary certification. Stakeholders deploying slices may decide to install USIM on the UICC of user devices to ensure a high level of security to access their slices and prevent the emergence of unauthorized users.
SIM Technology Innovation: An In-Depth Look at eSIM and vSIM
01.eSIM   eSIM, known as Embedded-SIM, or Embedded SIM, is a programmable, electronic SIM card technology whose main feature is that it does not require a physical slot, but rather an embedded chip that is integrated directly into the device's circuit board or inside other devices. Hardware part_     Integrated Circuit (IC) Chip: At the heart of the eSIM is a small IC chip that is built into the device's motherboard, similar to a physical SIM card. It contains the necessary hardware (CPU, ROM, RAM, EEPROM and serial communication unit) for storing and processing SIM data.   Software part_     Operating System (OS): The eSIM chip runs a dedicated operating system, often referred to as eUICC (Embedded Universal Integrated Circuit Card), which manages the SIM's functions, including data storage, secure processing and communication.     eSIM Production Process   ① Chip Manufacturing ② Chip testing ③ Integration into devices ④ Embedded software loading ⑤ Functional testing and verification   Virtual SIM (vSIM) is a SIM card technology without a physical form factor that allows devices to realize communication functions through software, including SoftSIM, CloudSIM, and others.   02.Virtual SIM (vSIM)   Virtual SIM (vSIM) is a SIM card technology without a physical form factor that allows devices to realize communication functions through software, including SoftSIM, CloudSIM, and others.   SoftSIM controls the information written to SoftSIM through the terminal provider, and the user purchases and uses communication services directly through the software without the intervention of the operator, which cuts off the direct connection between the user and the operator.   CloudSIM is a kind of SIM card function realized based on cloud computing technology, where users use network services on their devices through cloud services.   03.SIM service activation process   CloudSIM integrates the traffic resources of each operator into the cloud, selects operators according to the signal and network quality of different regions, and pushes them to the terminals to provide users with the best network services. The inclusion of multiple operators facilitates users to flexibly choose more favorable packages.       Do you want to learn more about SIM cards and other communication topics? We will continue to share more about this! See you in the next issue!
NTN Challenges and Solutions for Random Access
I. NTN Access: Random Access Channel (RACH) is a fundamental process for initial connection, uplink synchronization, and scheduling authorization between the terminal equipment (UE) and the network. While this is a mature and well-understood process in traditional terrestrial radio access networks (RANs), its implementation in Non-Terrestrial Networks (NTNs) presents a series of unique and more complex technical challenges. In terrestrial RANs, radio frequency signals typically propagate over short and predictable distances, and the propagation environment is relatively stable; however, in NTN networks involving Low Earth Orbit (LEO), Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), and Geostationary Orbit (GEO) satellites, radio frequency signals are affected by extremely long propagation distances, rapid satellite movement, dynamic coverage areas, and time-varying channel conditions. All these factors significantly impact the timing, frequency, and channel reliability that traditional RACH processes rely on.   II. NTN Characteristics: Due to extremely long transmission distances, rapid satellite movement, and time-varying coverage and channel conditions, NTN presents unique critical drawbacks (e.g., large propagation delay, long round-trip time, Doppler shift, beam mobility, and large contention domain) that severely challenge and impact the terminal's random access channel (RACH) behavior and performance. Furthermore, satellites are subject to strict limitations in terms of spectrum availability and power budget, making efficient and robust random access mechanisms particularly crucial.   III. Impacts and Solutions: To overcome the difficulties that NTN presents for terminal access, 3GPP has addressed some issues in its specifications, but the following aspects require attention:   3.1 TA (Timing Advance) Challenges Impacts: In NTN networks, due to large cell areas, satellite movement, and varying distances between the UE and the satellite, timing advance estimation is far more complex than in terrestrial systems. Incorrect TA estimation can cause uplink transmissions to fall outside the satellite's reception window, resulting in collisions or complete reception failure. Solution: Advanced TA estimation techniques are needed, such as utilizing satellite ephemeris data, GNSS assistance, or predictive algorithms, to dynamically adjust UE timing alignment and maintain uplink synchronization.   3.2 Doppler Shift Effects Impacts: The relative motion between the satellite and the UE introduces significant Doppler shifts, especially in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) systems. These frequency shifts reduce preamble detection accuracy, impair frequency synchronization, and increase the likelihood of RACH attempt failures. Solution: Robust Doppler pre-compensation and frequency tracking mechanisms are required on both the UE and network sides to maintain reliable RACH performance under high mobility conditions.   3.3 Channel Condition Variations: Impact: NTN links are subject to atmospheric attenuation, shadowing, scintillation, and long-distance path loss. These factors increase the block error rate and may affect the UE's ability to correctly receive RAR messages after successfully transmitting the preamble. Solution: Adaptive modulation and coding, power control, and robust physical layer design are needed to maintain reliable RACH detection and processing under various channel conditions.   3.4 Wide Coverage and High Terminal Density: Impact: Satellite beams typically cover very large geographical areas, potentially serving thousands of UEs simultaneously. This significantly increases the level of RACH contention and the probability of collisions, especially in large-scale access scenarios. Solution: Efficient RACH resource partitioning, load-aware access control, and intelligent contention management mechanisms are needed to scale random access performance.   3.5 Increased RTT (Latency and Round-Trip Time): Impact:The large physical distance between the UE and the satellite introduces significant one-way propagation delay and longer RTT. For example, the round-trip time (RTT) for a geostationary orbit (GEO) satellite link can reach hundreds of milliseconds. These delays directly affect the timing of Random Access Response (RAR) message exchange, potentially leading to premature timer timeouts, increased access failure rates, and prolonged access delays. Solution: RACH-related timers, such as the Random Access Response (RAR) window and collision resolution timers, must be designed based on NTN-specific RTT values. NTN-aware timer configuration is crucial to prevent unnecessary retransmissions and access failures.   3.6 Increased Collisions: Impact: A large number of user equipment (UEs) contending for a limited number of RACH preambles increases the probability of preamble collisions, thereby reducing access efficiency and increasing latency. Solution: Advanced collision resolution schemes, dynamic preamble allocation, and NTN-optimized access barring techniques are key to reducing collision probability.   3.7 Synchronization Challenges: Impact: Initial synchronization in NTN is complicated by large timing uncertainties and frequency offsets. Failure to achieve accurate synchronization can prevent the user equipment (UE) from initiating the Random Access Channel (RACH) process altogether. Solutions: Enhanced synchronization techniques, combining precise timing acquisition, Doppler compensation, and satellite position awareness, are needed for successful random access.   3.8 Power Control Impact: UEs in NTN experience significant variations in path loss depending on their position relative to the satellite beam. Insufficient transmit power may lead to preamble detection failure, while excessive power can cause inter-UE interference. Solution: Adaptive and location-aware power control mechanisms are crucial for balancing detection reliability and interference management.   3.9 Beam Management Impact: NTN systems heavily rely on multi-beam architectures. UEs may need to perform beam acquisition or switching during the RACH process, which increases complexity and latency. Solution: Efficient beam discovery, beam tracking, and seamless beam switching mechanisms are essential for ensuring reliable RACH execution in beam-based NTN systems.

2026

01/12

5G Terminal (UE) Reachability Definition and Limitations
I. Reachability In mobile communication networks, UE reachability refers to the network's ability to locate a terminal device (UE) to transmit data, which is particularly important for UEs in an idle state. It involves states such as CM-IDLE, modes such as MICO (Mobile Initiated Connection Only), and the process by which the UE or network (AMF, UDM, HSS) notifies other parties when the UE is active or has access to specific services (e.g., SMS or data). During this process, data is buffered, and the terminal (UE) is paged when necessary to achieve terminal power saving (PSM/eDRX). 3GPP defines it in TS23.501 as follows;   II. CM-IDLE State For non-3GPP access networks (untrusted, trusted non-3GPP access networks) and W-5GAN, where the UE corresponds to 5G-RG in the W-5GAN case and W-AGF in the case of supporting FN-RG. For N5CW devices accessing 5GC via a trusted WLAN access network, their UEs correspond to TWIF. Specifically, the UE cannot page via a non-3GPP access network. If the UE state in the AMF is CM-IDLE or RM-REGISTERED for the non-3GPP access network, there may be PDU calls where the last route was through the non-3GPP access network and user plane resources are lacking. If the AMF receives a message from the SMF containing a non-3GPP access type indication, corresponding to a PDU session of a UE in the CMIDLE state of non-3GPP access, and this UE has registered for 3GPP access in the same PLMN as the non-3GPP access, then regardless of whether the UE is in the CM-IDLE or CM-CONNECTED state on the 3GPP access, it can execute network-triggered service requests via the 3GPP access. In this case, the AMF will provide indication that the process is related to non-3GPP access (as described in Section 5.6.8) – the UE's behavior upon receiving such a network-triggered service request is specified in Section 5.6.8.   III. CM-CONNECTED State for non-3GPP access networks (untrusted, trusted non-3GPP access networks) and W-5GAN, where the UE corresponds to 5G-RG in the case of W-5GAN and W-AGF in the case of FN-RG support. For N5CW devices accessing 5GC through a trusted WLAN access network, the UE corresponds to TWIF. A UE in the CM-CONNECTED state is defined where:   the AMF knows the UE's position at the N3IWF, TNGF, TWIF, and W-AGF node granularities. When the UE is unreachable from the perspective of N3IWF, TNGF, TWIF, and W-AGF, i.e. when the non-3GPP access connection is released, N3IWF, TNGF, TWIF, and W-AGF will release the N2 connection.

2026

01/09

Non-3GPP Access to 5G Terminal (UE) Registration and Connection Management (1)
5G (NR) allows terminals (UEs) to access the system via trusted non-3GPP, untrusted non-3GPP, and W-5GAN systems; for this purpose, 3GPP defines the following in TS23.501:   I. Registration Management For terminals (UEs) accessing the 5G system via W-5GAN, the corresponding term is 5G-RG, while for FN-RG it corresponds to W-AGF. For N5CW terminals (UEs) accessing the 5GC via a trusted WLAN access network, the corresponding term is TWIF. When accessing via non-3GPP, the terminal (UE) and AMF should enter the RM-DEREGISTERED state as follows:   - After an explicit deregistration procedure is performed at both the UE and AMF; - After the network's non-3GPP implicit deregistration timer expires at the AMF; - After the UE's non-3GPP deregistration timer expires at the UE. ---Assuming sufficient time is allowed for the UE to reactivate the UP connection of an established PDU session, regardless of whether the session was established via 3GPP or non-3GPP access.   II. Terminal (UE) Access When a UE registers via non-3GPP access, it starts a UE non-3GPP deregistration timer based on the value received from the AMF during the registration process when entering the non-3GPP access CM-IDLE state. In non-3GPP access mode, the AMF runs a network non-3GPP implicit deregistration timer. When the CM state of the registered UE changes to CM-IDLE via non-3GPP access mode, the network non-3GPP implicit deregistration timer will start at a value greater than the UE non-3GPP deregistration timer value. For UEs registered via non-3GPP access mode, access point changes (e.g., WLAN AP changes) should not cause the UE to perform the registration process. The UE should not provide 3GPP-specific parameters (e.g., indications of MICO mode preferences) during registration via non-3GPP access mode.   III. Upon successful connection management, a UE accessing the 5GC via non-3GPP will transition to CM-CONNECTED (non-3GPP access). Specifically: For untrusted non-3GPP access to the 5GC, the non-3GPP access connection corresponds to an NWu connection. For trusted access to the 5GC, the non-3GPP access connection corresponds to an NWt connection. For N5CW devices accessing the 5GC via a trusted LAN, the non-3GPP access connection corresponds to a Yt' connection. For wired access to the 5GC, the non-3GPP access connection corresponds to Y4 and Y5 connections.   ***A UE will not establish multiple non-3GPP access connections to the 5GC simultaneously; non-3GPP access connections can be released through an explicit deregistration procedure or an AN release procedure.

2026

01/08